Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Daniel C. Brown v. CCC&T : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
W. Brent Wilcox; Edward B. Havas; Wilcox, Dewsnup and King; Roger D. Sandack; Attorneys for
Plaintiff.
James R. Black; Callister, Duncan and Nebeker; L. Rich Humphreys; Mark L. Anderson;
Christensen, Jensen and Powell; Robert G. Gilchrist; Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson; Attorneys
for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Brown v. CCC&T, No. 910082.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3437

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT

UTAH

45.9

SUPReME COURJ
BRtEB

*>OCKETNO

^7/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL C

BROWN,

P l a i n t i f f and Appellee,
v.

BOWMAN & KEMP STEEL AND SUPPLY
COMPANY, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee,
and
JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellate No. 910082
Priority No. 16

JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
CCC&T, Inc., a Utah Corporation,
Third-Party Defendant and
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE DANIEL C. BROWN
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

F I L &2 D
FEB

7 1992

CLERK SUPREME COUPT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL C. BROWN,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
V •

J

BOWMAN & KEMP STEEL AND SUPPLY
COMPANY, INC., a Utah Corporation, ]
Defendant and Appellee,
and
JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

i

Appellate No. 910082

Defendant and Appellant.

i

Priority No. 16

JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,
i

V •

CCC&T, Inc., a Utah Corporation,
Third-Party Defendant and
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE DANIEL C. BROWN
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

W. Brent Wilcox, Esq.
Edward B. Havas, Esq.
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Roger D. Sandack, Esq.
136 South Main Street, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellee Daniel Brown

James R. Black, Esq.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
10 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Attorney for CCC&T, Inc.
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.
Mark L. Anderson, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Jacobsen-Robbins Construction Company
Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorney for Bowman & Kemp Steel and Supply, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

1

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

3

ARGUMENT
I. The Liability Reform Act of 1986 precludes the
relief sought by appellant, •
A.
The plain language of the statute prevents the
result sought by appellant
B.
The legislative intent behind the enactment of
the Liability Reform Act reinforces the
reading of it to preclude comparison of the
employer's fault
II. Any claim by appellant that the trial court's order
precludes it from arguing superseding or
intervening cause is harmless error

4

6

CONCLUSION

7

•

1

4
4

5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
George v. LDS Hospital,
(Utah App. 1990)
Harris v. Utah Transit
219 (Utah 1983)
Horton v. The Royal
Rep. 4, 5 (1991)
Sneddon v. Graham,
(Ct. App. 1991)
Tanner v. Phoenix
(Utah App. 1991)

797 P.2d 1117, 1122
7
Authority,

671 P.2d 217,
7

Order

of the Sun,

175 Utah Adv.
4, 5

175 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14
1, 4
Ins.

Co.,

799 P.2d 231, 233
1

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann.

§ 35-1-60

2

Utah Code Ann.

§ 35-1-62

2

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-37

2-4

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-38

2,3

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-39

2, 3, 5

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-40

2,3

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-41

2,3

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-42

2, 3

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-43

2-4

Utah Code Ann.

§§ 35-1-1 et seq

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Supp. 1991)

2, 3
1

OTHER
Liability Reform Act of 1986

4,7

Substitute S.B. 64, 1/31/86

5, 6
ii

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff/appellee

Brown

(hereafter

"Brown")

submits

the

following in addition to the arguments contained in the brief of
appellee CCC&T, Inc. ("CCC&T"), with which Brown concurs and to
which

arguments

Brown

subscribes

and

incorporates

by

this

reference.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Supp. 1991); Utah R. App. P. 3.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Brown is dissatisfied1 with appellant's statement of the
issues in that appellant reads the order appealed from, and thus
the issues on appeal, too broadly. Brown concurs in the statement
of the issues stated by CCC&T.
Because this is an issue of statutory interpretation, it
presents

a

correctness.

question
Sneddon

of
v.

App. 1991) (citing Tanner

law

which

Graham,
v.

this

court

reviews

for

175 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Ct.

Phoenix

Ins.

Co.,

799 P.2d 231, 233

(Utah App. 1991)).
Brown, like CCC&T, will not address the issue of indemnity
between appellant and its co-defendant Bowman & Kemp Steel Supply
Co., Inc.

'See, Utah R. App. P. 24(b).
1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutes upon which this issue turns are:
Utah Workers/ Compensation Act.

§§ 35-1-1 et seq., U.C.A.

1.
§ 35-1-60, U.C.A. Exclusive remedy against employer, or
officer, agent or employee—Occupational disease excepted.
2.
§ 35-1-62, U.C.A. Injuries or death caused by wrongful
acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or
employee of said employer, officer, agent, or employee of said
employer—Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of
action—Notice of intention to proceed against third party—
Right to maintain action not involving employee-employers
relationship—Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
These statutory provisions
attached hereto.
Utah Liability Reform Act.
(1986)

are reproduced

as Addendum 1

S 78-27-37 to S 78-27-43, U.C.A.

1.

§ 78-27-37, U.C.A.

Definitions.

2.

§ 78-27-38, U.C.A.

Comparative negligence.

3.
§ 78-27-39, U.C.A. Separate special verdicts on total
damages and proportion of fault.
4.
§ 78-27-40, U.C.A.
Amount of liability
proportion of fault—No contribution.
5.

§ 78-27-41, U.C.A.

limited to

Joinder of defendants.

6.
§ 78-27-42, U.C.A. Release to one defendant does not
discharge other defendants.
7.
§ 78-27-43, U.C.A. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy,
indemnity, contribution•
These statutory provisions are reproduced as Addendum 2,
attached hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brown is satisfied with the statement of the case set forth by
appellant.

To avoid unnecessary repetition, Brown concurs in and
2

incorporates by this reference the statement of facts set out by
CCC&T.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation
Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-1, et seq.
Brown's employer, CCC&T, immune from suit*

(1988) render

The plain language of

the Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37
through

43

(1987)

is

clear

and

unambiguous.

It

expressly

recognizes the employer's immunity and precludes naming an immune
entity such as the employer as a party to this action, whether for
purposes of obtaining a recovery or having "fault" compared with
that of defendants. For the same reasons, the employer may not be
included on the jury verdict form as a non-party for such fault
comparison.
Even if construed to be ambiguous, the legislative intent
behind the Liability Reform Act clearly supports the conclusion
that immune parties such as employers were not contemplated to be
among those whose fault is to be compared pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-39.

To give this act the effect intended by the

legislature, this Court must uphold the trial court's order.
Any argument by appellant that the trial court's order may be
interpreted to preclude argument that the employer's conduct is
either an intervening or superseding cause is harmless error.
Besides the fact the parties do not interpret the order that way,
the evidence fails to support a claim that the employer's conduct
was an intervening or superseding cause.
3

ARGUMENT
I.

The Liability Reform Act of 1986 precludes the
relief sought by appellant.

A.
The plain language of the statute prevents the result
sought by appellant.
This Court has recently reiterated the rules of statutory
construction.

"The general rule of statutory construction is that

where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not
look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative
intent."

Horton

v.

The Royal

Order of the Sun, 175 Utah Adv. Rep.
See also,

v. Graham,

175

The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous.

The

4, 5 (1991) (citations omitted).

Sneddon

Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.

terms "defendant" and "person seeking recovery" are defined by
section 372. Neither definition extends to employers.
A defendant is any person "not immune from suit who is claimed
to be liable because of fault. . ." An employer, whose immunity is
expressly preserved in section 43, cannot fit that description.3
Nor is the employer claimed to be liable because of fault.
Indeed, the appellant does not claim the employer is liable (i.e.,
answerable in damages) at all.

Further, as CCC&T establishes at

length, the employer cannot be claimed liable because of fault,
which is defined in section 37 as an "actionable breach of duty..."
The employer, subject to the statutory obligations of the worker's
2

Except otherwise noted, all section references are to Utah
Code Ann. Title 78, Chapter 27 (1987).
3

The employer is likewise not a person seeking recovery, nor
does appellant claim it to be.
4

compensation laws without consideration of fault, is not subject to
an "actionable" duty and therefor cannot commit an "actionable
breach of duty."
Section 39 provides that a jury's determination of comparative
fault extends to a consideration of "the percentage or proportion
of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each
defendant."

These terms are clearly defined in the Act and, as

noted above, exclude employers. The clear and unambiguous language
of the Act
appellant.

itself

therefore

precludes

the relief

sought by

The trial court's order should be upheld.

B.
The legislative intent behind the enactment of the
Liability Reform Act reinforces the reading of it to preclude
comparison of the employer's fault.
Even if the statute were to be viewed as ambiguous and
requiring reference to extrinsic information for interpretation,
see, Horton,

175 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5, the history of the passage of

this act supports the conclusion that the employer is not among
those whose conduct is to be considered by the jury.

As noted by

CCC&T, the legislation enacted as the Liability Reform Act was a
substitute bill, which replaced Senate Bill (S.B.) 64. A draft of
S.B. 64 proposed that section 39 permit comparison of the fault of
each person seeking recovery, each defendant and each other person
whose fault contributed to the injury or damages. See, Substitute
S.B. 64 dated January 31, 1986 (attached as Addendum 3) (emphasis
added)•
This language, which arguably would have permitted the very
sort of comparison sought by appellant, was deleted in the final
5

version of S.B. 64 which was ultimately enacted into the statute
now before the Court. Other provisions of the legislation remained
unchanged.

This change was an advised one.

Senator Kay Cornaby, Chairman of the State and Local Committee
considering the bill, reported the final bill out of committee
under cover of a letter stating that the committee had "carefully
considered"

the

bill.4

The

committee

recommended

that

the

substitute bill replace the original and be amended to delete the
expansive third category of persons (i.e., "other person[s] whose
fault contributed to the injury or damages") from comparison of
fault by the jury. This recommendation was accepted and the final
version passed without provision for comparison of the fault of
others.

This clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative

intent ought not to be frustrated as appellant seeks.
II.

Any claim by appellant that the trial court's order
precludes it from arguing superseding or
intervening cause is harmless error.

Appellant contends that the trial court's order is erroneous
because it precludes the appellant from arguing that the injury was
the result of an intervening or superseding cause.
is fatuous.

This argument

As noted by CCC&T in its brief, the appellant

misconstrues the order. Neither Brown nor CCC&T construe the order
to so constrain appellant.
However, even were the order so interpreted, the error would
be harmless. The evidence before the court does not lend itself to

4

Senator Cornaby's letter is attached as Addendum 4.
6

a

conclusion

operating.

that

an

intervening

or

superseding

cause

was

At best, the evidence might be interpreted to show a

concurrent cause, but that would neither preclude a finding that
appellant's conduct was a proximate cause of the injury nor
eliminate appellant's liability.
George

There may be more than one proximate cause.
Hospital,

797 P.2d

1117# 1122 (Utah App. 1990).

v. LDS

"A person's

negligence is not superseded by the negligence of another if the
subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable."
Transit

Authority,

Harris

671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983).

v.

Utah

One is not

excused from liability merely because the later negligence of
another

concurs

foreseeable.

Id.

to

cause

injury,

if

the

later

conduct

was

at 220 (citations omitted).

In the instant case, Brown contends that the appellant,
Jacobsen-Robbins Construction Co., negligently failed to erect the
safety cable as was its responsibility.

Appellant seeks to argue

that the employer was negligent in not properly instructing its
employees to weld from the outer edge in or to otherwise avoid the
building edges.

Even if that were so (which Brown in no way

concedes), such a failure by the employer cannot be claimed to be
so "'extraordinary' as to be unforeseeable," id.,
not a superseding or intervening cause.

and is therefore

Therefore, even if the

trial court's order is defective, the defect is harmless.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly determined that under the Liability
Reform Act of 1986 employers and other immune persons are not to be
7

considered by the jury for purposes of fault comparison, whether
made parties or not. This Court should uphold that construction of
the act and affirm the lower court's order dismissing the third
party complaint against the employer and precluding consideration
of the employer's "negligence," if any, by the jury*

DATED this 5th day of February, 1992.
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING

w a r ^ S .^favas
Attoamey for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l e e
Daniel C. Brown
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ADDENDUM 1
S 35-1-60 Utah Code Annotated
and
§ 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-60

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Notice and opportunity to be heard.
This section inferentially at least provides
that the commission shall give notice and an
opportunity to be heard to all persons whose
rights may be affected by its award. Therefore,

commission, whose award has been annulled,
cannot amend its findings of facts without giving employer notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 638.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
*= 1765.

35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917,
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1.
Cross-References. — Employment of children, § 34-23-1 et seq.

Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law,
§ 35-2-1 et seq.
Meaning of "this act". — See the note under the same catchline following § 35-1-46.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Compulsory.
Effect of no-fault insurance.
Employer.
Exclusiveness of remedy.
—Minor engaged in hazardous employment.
Farmers and domestics.
Hospital charges.
Indemnification agreement between employer and third party.
Indemnity agreement.
Intentional tort.
Joint venture.
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to third parties,
id adequacy of act.
injury by employee of same employer.
>nal disease.
employer
ent control."
ictor's employee,
ility of employer,
rapacity" doctrine.

state act. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 84 Utah 364, 35 P.2d 842, 94 A.L.R.
1423 (1934).
This section abrogates employee's commonlaw nght to sue employer for injuries suffered
while in course of employment, except where
employer is not subject to this act or commonlaw remedy of employee is expressly reserved.
Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L.
Ed. 411 (1948)
This section makes it clear that this chapter
is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation for injury or death, against the employer
and other employees to the exclusion of any
and all other civil liability whatsover, at common law or otherwise, and that it bars all next
of kin or dependents, or anyone else, from
using any other means of recovery against employers and others named in and covered by
the Act, than the Act itself. Momll v. J & M
Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981).

lory.
Workmen's Compensation Act is comind not elective. Lovato v. Beatrice
! Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969).
f no-fault insurance.
Vo-Fault Insurance Act, former
et seq., did not supersede or nullify
unen's Compensation Act's exclusive
mmsion as applied to injuries from
hide accidents suffered in the course
pment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen,
296 (Utah 1975)
jr.

r was employee of cable television
, its subsidiary, and its limited parttirposes of the exclusive remedy p r o w
the Utah Workmen's Compensation
re the cable television company, as
A management style, grouped all emtogether under its direct control and
le worker's time sheets and checks
uiaged by the cable television comeund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F
>2 <D. Utah 1985).
treness of remedy.
this section when the injury is caused
sghgent act of the employer, no willful
net being claimed, the injured emr, when the injury causes death, his
tits, must be content to accept the comn provided by the act. Hailing v InComm'n, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78

— Minor engaged in hazardous employment.
Even if a minor employee is injured while
engaged in hazardous employment in violation
of § 34-23-2, prohibiting the employment of
minors in hazardous occupations, the minor's
exclusive remedy is through this chapter, and
the minor cannot void her employment contract and sue in tort. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp.,
707 P 2d 678 (Utah 1985)

the enactment of the Workmen's Comn Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy of
oyee who is injured in the course of his
lent is the nght to recover the compenrovided for in the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.)
v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430,
940 (1929); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet
sundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P2d 885

Farmers and domestics.
Farm laborers and domestic servants, in the
event of an accident or injury, are entitled to
pursue their common-law remedies in an action against the employer because they are excepted from the act by §§ 35-1-42 and 35-1-43.
Murray v Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922
(1930)

>yee of railroad was not precluded from
aim for compensation by application
der Federal Employers' Liability Act
nd of election since employee did not
o remedies but only one; if injury was
i while he was engaged in interstate
ce, his remedy was under Federal EmLiabihty Act and if not, it was under

Hospital charges.
The only power given the Industrial Commission by the workers' compensation statutes
over hospital charges for services rendered to
injured employees is the nght to refuse to pay
that part of them which is excessive in amount
or for care which was not reasonably necessary; Industrial Commission does not have the
power and authority to set maximum rates

191
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venture. Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29
Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104 (1973).

which hospitals may charge for services rendered injured employees, and hospitals are nott
prohibited from holding an injured employee5
liable for any amounts not paid by the commission. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982).

Liability to third parties.
Where plaintiff employee was injured when
a fellow employee drove the truck in which
they were nding into the side of a train, and
brought an action against the railroad and the
manufacturer of the crossing signal, alleging
negligent upkeep and product defect, respectively, neither defendant could join plaintiffs
employer as a third-party defendant in order to
assert a claim for contribution from it under
the joint tort-feasor statute. Curtis v. Harmon
Elec, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980)
(decided under prior law).

Indemnification agreement between employer and third party.
Where employer and third party voluntarilyr
enter into a written indemnification agreement whereby the employer agrees to indemnify the third party against claims arising outI
of injuries to the employer's employees, and1
where an employee is injured and is compen-.
sated by the employer in accordance with the5
workers' compensation law, the exclusive rem-*
edy provision of this section does not precludethe enforcement of the indemnification agreement by the third party against the employerr
for amounts paid by the third party to the employee as a result of the injury. Shell Oil Co. v.
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187r
(Utah 1983).
Indemnity agreement
An indemnity agreement is a separate undertaking by the employer that will be enforceable despite workers' compensation if the indemnity provision expressly covers the indemnitor's employees, but the phrase "person or
persons" does not cover indemnitor's own em-•
ployees given the dramatic consequences of
such an interpretation. Wollam v. Kennecott
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987).
Intentional tort
Provision prohibiting action for damagesi
against fellow employee does not prohibit
maintenance of action for premeditated and intentional act of fellow employee. Bryan v. Utah
Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975).
Joint venture.
Construction company obtained contract to
construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered
into agreement with corporation by which the
two organizations would unite their efforts to
complete such construction and share in profits
or losses from the enterprise. Miner, hired by
the construction company, who was injured
while working on the tunnel and who obtained
workmen's compensation benefits, could not
sue corporation for alleged negligence of corporate employees since the two companies were
regarded as the employing unit. The employees
of both companies were engaged in the same
employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15
Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963).
This section barred suit by workmen against
joint venturer which was his employer for injuries sustained in use of machine furnished by a
second joint venturer, where machine was furnished pursuant to contract creating the joint

Nature and adequacy of act.
The workers' compensation scheme is purely
statutory, and the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.) provides a plain, speedy, and adequate method of
review. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74
Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929).
Negligent injury by employee of same employer.
Where subcontractor was an "employee" of
contractor, other employee of contractor could
not maintain negligence action against subcontractor but must look to workers' compensation
insurance. Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d
139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968).
Occupational disease.
Administratrix of deceased city employee,
who died from inhalation of paint he was ordered to spray on trucks, could bring an action
at law against the employer, since such was
not an accidental injury compensable under
this act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.), but was an "occupational disease." Young v. Salt Lake City, 97
Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (1939).
Statutory employer.
—"Sufficient control."
Where joint owners of interests in oil and gas
leases provided for construction of a gas processing plant located in Utah, to be operated as
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose
of extracting liquid hydrocarbons, and under
the operating agreement the owners reserved
the power of ultimate control over the project
and over the operator thereof, the owners retained "sufficient control" to qualify as statutory employers of an employee of the operator
pursuant to § 35-1-42(2) and the exclusive
remedy provision of this section applied Lamb
v. W-Energy, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah
1987).
Subcontractor's employee.
Subcontractor's employee could not recover
from general contractor in civil action for injuries on theory that subcontractor was his em-
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pacity that confers on him an obligation independent of those imposed on him as an employer Worthen v Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d
856 (10th Cir. 1985)
An employee cannot hold his employer liable
in tort for injuries resulting from the employer's maintenance of unsafe premises, on
the reasoning that the employer occupies a separate capacity and owes separate duties to his
employees as an owner of the premises, since
the employer's duty to maintain a safe workplace is inseparable from the employer's general duties as an employer toward his employees. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d
678 (Utah 1985).
The dual capacity doctrine did not apply to a
products liability claim brought on behalf of a
decedent who was killed when he was pulled
into a large screw-auger manufactured by defendant while decedent was working on his employer's premises, where the employer had not
assumed a separate and distinct obligation toward his employee other than as employer.
Stewart v CMI Corp, 740 P 2d 1340 (Utah
1987)

T and general contractor was a third perlot in the same employment. Smith v AlBrown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P 2d 994
2)
us section does not forbid or render invalid
use in a construction subcontract by which
subcontractor agreed to indemnify the
ie contractor and save him harmless for all
hty arising out of the injury or death of an
loyee of subcontractor, where such clause
ted and decedent workman's administrasued pnme contractor for wrongful death
lecedent and recovered; therefore, decet's employer is required to reimburse pnme
xactor covered by workmen's compensation
provided in such indemnity clause. Titan
»i Corp. v. Walton, 365 F 2d 542 (10th Cir
6)
-t liability of employer.
"Dual capacity" doctrine.
ftah law does not recognize as an exception
the exclusive remedy provisions of the
rker's Compensation Act, the so-called
tal capacity" doctrine under which an emyer, shielded from tort liability by the act,
y become liable in tort if he occupies, in adion to his capacity as employer, a second ca-

Cited in Smith v Atlantic Richfield Co., 814
F2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Alvs Contribution Against Co-tortfeasor Deite Immunity from District Suit Bishop v
elsen, 1982 B.Y.U.L. Rev 429
C.J.S. — 101 C J S. Workmen's Compensa>n § 918.
A.L.R. — Insured's receipt of or right to
jrkmen's compensation benefits as affecting
covery under accident, hospital, or medical
pense policy, 40 A L R 3d 1012
Workers' compensation law as precluding

employee's suit against employer for third person's criminal attack, 49 A.L.R.4th 926.
Workers' compensation act as precluding
tort action for injury to or death of employee's
unborn child, 55 A.L.R.4th 792.
Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coemployee as ground of liability despite bar of
workers' compensation law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
*» 2084

5-1-61. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 35-1-61 (C. 1943, Supp ,
2-1-57-10, enacted by L 1945, ch 65, § 2),
slating to injuries to or death of illegally em-

ployed minor, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch.
76, » 11
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35-1-59. Docketing awards in district court — Enforcing
judgment.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
would have to seek satisfaction of the employer's obligation through proceedings in the
district court under this section. Thomas A.
Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'nt 770 P2d
125 (Utah 1989).

Uninsured Employers' Fund.
Commission's order finding an uninsured
employer liable for benefits paid to an injured
employee by the Uninsured Employers' Fund
was affirmed with the direction that the fund

35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
P2d 1138 (Utah 1990), cert, granted,
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co , 773 P 2d
405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Requiring an injured employee to show that
his employer or fellow employee manifested a
deliberate intent to injure him before allowing
an exception to the statute for an intentional
tort is fully consistent with the purpose of the
workers' compensation act. Knowledge to a
substantial certainty that injury will follow is
not sufficient to invoke the exception. Lantz v
National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P2d 937
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)

ANALYSIS

Exclusiveness of remedy.
Federal law
Indemnification agreement between employer
and third party.
Intentional tort.
Statutory employer.
Exclusiveness of remedy.
Former county employee's claims against the
county or against individual co-employees
based on negligent infliction of emotional distress or otherwise based upon negligence were
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of
this section. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735
F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990).
Federal law.
Federal government employee was barred
from bringing negligence suit against a fellow
employee where, under federal law, the employee's exclusive remedy was against the
United States and she had filed for and received benefits from the United States government. Hope v Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Indemnification agreement between employer and third party.
The exclusive remedy provision of this section bars a claim by a third party that a statutory employer impliedly agreed to mdemmfy
the third party against claims for injuries sustained by an employee. Freund v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990).
Intentional tort.
An employee who, in the course and scope of
his or her employment, intentionally acts to
injure a co-worker is not protected by the exclusivity provision from a separate action at
law for damages. But, in such a case, the employer is liable only to the extent of workers'
compensation benefits unless the injurious act
was directed or intended by the employer 795

Statutory employer.
The legislature has, in clear and unmistakable language, evinced an intention to allow
suits by an injured worker against those persons who might be his or her statutory employers as defined in § 35-1-42. The immediate, or common-law, employer, who actually
pays compensation, and its officers, agents,
and employees are shielded by the exclusive
remedy immunity conferred by this section.
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428
(Utah 1989).
The decision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.,
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), holding that the
state Workers' Compensation Act should no
longer be construed to provide tort immunity
to statutory employers who have not been required to pay benefits thereunder to the injured worker, should be given retroactive effect. Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F 2d 1349
(10th Cir. 1989) (reversing Lamb v. W-Energy,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1987), which
appears under this catchline in bound volume)
A worker can sue a statutory employer who
has not been required to pay workers' compensation benefits, and the latter is not protected
by the immunity afforded by this section.
Bosch v Busch Development, Inc., 777 P2d
431 (Utah 1989).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. — "Dual capacity doctrine" as basis
for employee's recovery for medical malpractice from company medical personnel, 73
A.L.R.4th 115.
Workers' compensation: third-party tort lia-

bility of corporate officer to injured workers, 76
A.L.R.4th 365.
Workers' compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor's tort action, 77
A.L.R.4th 844.

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery,
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statutory employers.
The legislature has, in clear and unmistakable language, evinced an intention to allow
suits by an injured worker against those persons who might be his or her statutory employers as defined in § 35-1-42. The immediate, or common-law, employer, who actually
pays compensation, and its officers, agents,
and employees are shielded by the exclusive
remedy immunity conferred by § 35-1-60. Pate
v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah
1989).
The decision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.,
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), holding that the
state Workers' Compensation Act should no

longer be construed to provide tort immunity
to statutory employers who have not been required to pay benefits thereunder to the injured worker, should be given retroactive effect. Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349
(10th Cir. 1989) (reversing Lamb v. W-Energy,
IncM 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1987), which
appears under "Applicability of section" catchline in bound volume).
A worker can sue a statutory employer who
has not been required to pay workers' compensation benefits, and the latter is not protected
by the immunity afforded by § 35-1-60. Bosch
v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431
(Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Prejudicial effect of bringing to
jury's attention fact that plaintiff in personal
injury or death action ia entitled to workers'
compensation benefits, 69 A.L.R.4th 131.
Workers' compensation: third-party tort liability of corporate officer to injured workers, 76
A.L.R.4th 365.
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Workers' compensation: compensability of
injuries incurred traveling to or from medical
treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83
A.L.R.4th 110.
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35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917, L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973,
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933, ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3.
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58;
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

tort-feasor prior to compensation award.
f section
cause of action
f statute.
rney fees.
rf recovery.
nses.
' doctrine.
ledies.
iry by fellow employee.
heirs.
t.
a.
ient.
commission,
s fund.
bility

t tort-feasor prior to compenward.
•kmen's compensation claimant
urd-party tort-feasor for sum
' compensation award she could
before filing compensation
•elieve compensation insurer of
imant award reflecting its proe of attorney's fees. Graham v
m'n, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491 P 2d

claimed from the employer or his insurance
earner Brainard's Cottonwood Dairy v. Industnal Comm'n, 80 Utah 159, 14 P.2d 212, 88
A.L.R. 659 (1935)
It was a condition precedent to the employee's nght to claim compensation from his
employer, where he was injured by negligence
of someone not his employer, that he should
assign his action for damages against the
wrongdoer Industnal Comm'n v. Wasatch
Grading Co , 80 Utah 223, 14 P 2d 988 (1932).

of section.
applies only to suits against
are not employers or deemed to
mployers Lamb v W-Energy,
ipp 395 (D Utah 1987).

Construction of statute.
This section covers both active and passive
negligence Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
107 Utah 114, 152 P2d 98 (1944).
Where state insurance fund paid compensation to injured person, the insurance earner
has a cause of action where the injury was
caused by third person; but this does not mean
that it had the only cause of action since this
section also gives the injured person a cause of
action against the third person. Rogalski v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282
P.2d 304 (1955)

f cause of action.
d been commenced against a
recover for the injuries or death
ich action must first have been
.e insurance fund as a condition
application under Workmen's
Act. Robinson v Industnal
tan 203, 269 P 513 (1928).
yee was killed in course of his
r
wrongful act of third person,
>e to claim compensation under
3 Compensation Act, but her
>se to sue under former section,
i widow declined to join, as asuse of action by widow to emficient, an assignment by the
necessary An assignment was
y when compensation was

Costs and attorney fees.
State supreme court decisions that permit
reasonable attorney fees to be deducted from
that portion of recovery gained to reimburse
state insurance fund do not apply retroactively
to fees determined in reliance on the former
rule Draper v Travelers Ins. Co., 429 F 2d 44
(10th Cir 1970), Williams v Utah State Dep't
of Fin , 23 Utah 2d 438, 464 P.2d 596 (1970).
Although insurer was entitled to reimburse-
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ment of payment made to injured employee
who subsequently recovered from third party,
equitable considerations required it to pay its
proportionate share of attorney's fees incurred
by injured employee in obtaining judgment
against third party Worthen v Shurtleff &
Andrews, Inc, 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P 2d 223
(1967)
State insurance fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) was required to bear its pro rata
share of reasonable attorney fees incurred by
claimant in obtaining settlement with third
party inasmuch as defendant insurance fund
was relieved from burden of paying award to
claimant Prettyman v Utah State Dep't of
Fin, 27 Utah 2d 333, 496 P2d 89 (1972)
Where an injured person who has collected
workmen's compensation sues third-party tortfeasor, both the injured person and the subrogated insurance earner bear their proportionate share of costs and attorney fees incurred in
obtaining recovery in tort suit Language
added to Subdivision (2) by the 1971 amendment was intended to eliminate prior uncertainty and make it clear that insurer should
bear its proportionate share, and insurer cannot avoid its share of expenses by hiring its
own counsel and notifying injured person of
that fact Lanier v Pyne, 29 Utah 2d 249, 508
P2d 38 (1973)
Disbursement of recovery.
—Medical expenses.
Commission properly interpreted the phrase
"any obligation" in Subsection (3) to include
medical expenses Taylor v
Industnal
Commn, 743 P2d 1183 (Utah 1987)
"Dual capacity" doctrine.
Utah law does not recognize as an exception
to the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act the so-called "dual
capacity' doctrine under which an employer,
shielded from tort liability by the act, mav become liable in tort if he occupies, in addition to
his capacity as employer, a second capacity
that confers on him an obligation independent
of those imposed on him as an employer
Worthen v Kennecott Corp, 780 F2d 856
(10th Cir 1985)
An employee cannot held his employer liable
in tort for injuries resulting from the employer's maintenance of unsafe premises, on
the reasoning that the employer occupies a separate capacity and owes separate duties to his
employees as an owner of the premises, since
the employer's duty to maintain a safe work
place is inseparable from the employers general duties as an employer toward his employees Bingham v Lagoon Corp, 707 P 2d
678 (Utah 1985)
Election of remedies.
Where city policeman was injured by third

person, and city paid policeman compensation
in form of wages, action by policeman against
third person which was dismissed without prejudice, commenced prior to assignment of cause
of action to city, was not an election so as to bar
policeman's subsequent claim for compensation from city Salt Lake City v Industnal
Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 17 P2d 239 (1932)
Employee of railroad was not precluded from
filing claim for compensation by application
filed under Federal Employers' Liability Act
on ground of election since employee did not
have two remedies but only one, if injury was
incurred while he was engaged in interstate
commerce his remedy was under Federal Employers' Liability Act, if not, it was under state
act Utah Idaho Cent RR v Industrial
Comm'n, 84 Utah 364, 35 P 2d 842, 94 A.L.R.
1423 (1933)
In a case in which fireman was killed by collapse of a ladder while in the performance of
his duty, his dependents could exercise their
right to elect under terms of this section to pursue their remedy against third-party wrongdoer Hamilton v Commission of Fin, 108
Utah 574, 162 P2d 758 (1945)
Intentional injury by fellow employee.
One who is injured by the intentional act of a
fellow employee may seek recovery for damages as provided for in this section Bryan v
Utah Int'l, 533 P 2d 892 (Utah 1975)
Joint venture.
Construction company obtained contract to
construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered
into agreement with corporation by which the
two organizations would unite their efforts to
complete such construction and share m profits
or losses from the enterprise Miner, hired by
the construction company, who was injured
while working on the tunnel, and who obtained
workmen's compensation benefits, could not
sue corporation for alleged negligence of corporate employees since the two companies were
regarded as the employing unit The employees
of both companies were engaged in the same
employment Cook v Peter Kiewit Sons Co, 15
Utah 2d 20, 386 P2d 616 (1963)
Nondependent heirs.
Legislature did not intend to divest the nght
of heirs to damages under the wrongful death
statute if they are nondependents and received
no compensation benefits Ohveras v CaribouFour Corners, Inc , 598 P 2d 1320 (Utah 1979)
Pleadings.
Complaint by assignee should allege payment of the award Johanson v Cudahy Packing Co, 101 Utah 219, 120 P2d 281 (1941)
Complaint was sufficient to state a cause of
action for negligence in action by dependents of
a truck driver who was killed when he backed
a truck into some high tension electric wires
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delivering a load of salt to defendant
ng company, which salt defendant had orfrom deceased's employer. Johanson v
hy Packing Co, 107 Utah 114, 152 P2d
944).
bursement
te insurance fund (Workers' Compensa'und) is entitled to be reimbursed not only
lat has been paid to the injured employee
»time of the trial, but also for any addi[ sum that it was legally obligated to pay
trial Comm'n v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80
223, 14 P.2d 988 (1932).
ired employee's settlement and release
u s private insurance earner, under uninmotonst coverage, did not affect claim of
insurance fund (Workers' Compensation
I against third-party tort-feasor and mempioyee was not required to reimburse
or workmen's compensation benefits paid
m. Southeast Furn. Co. v. Barrett, 24
2d 24, 465 P2d 346 (1970).
rd party was not entitled to have amount
gment awarded injured employee reduced
lount of workmen's compensation benefits
to employee; third party's contentions
•mployer also was negligent, that msur:ompany stood in shoes of employer and
juently that insurer should not recover
nt of compensation paid injured employee
ad. Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237
Cir. 1968).
purpose of the right of reimbursement
ished by this section is only to prevent
» recovery by the employee or his or her
dents. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 725 P.2d
(Utah 1986).
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son v Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997
(1972).
Employee of electrical subcontractor was "in
the same employment" as general contractor
and not entitled to maintain action under this
section where general contractor maintained
right to supervision or control over subcontractor by supervising overall continuity and integration of work among various subcontractors,
directing the sequence of work by the subcontractors, making changes in the work done by
them and ordenng work stoppages; decedent's
only remedy was under Workmen's Compensation Act. Adamson v. Okland Constr. Co., 29
Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973).
Where decedent employee of general contractor was electrocuted, allegedly through negligence of subcontractor, in accident occumng
pnor to 1975 amendment of this section, subcontractor was in same employment as decedent under § 35-1-42, and heirs were precluded from maintaining wrongful death action against it by provisions of § 35-1-60.
Shupe v. Wasatch Elec. Co., 546 P.2d 896
(Utah 1976).
Where plaintiffs decedent and another were
fellow employees at time of accident, this section prohibited action by plaintiff against the
fellow employee and similarly prohibited the
defendant from joining the fellow employee as
a joint tort-feasor for purposes of contnbution.
Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah
1980)
Settlements.
—Approval of commission.
This section does not require that the commission approve employee-initiated settlements The commission is required to approve
employer-initiated settlements in order to protect the interest of the employee and prevent
the employer from entenng into a settlement
that places the employer's welfare above that
of the employee. That concern is not present
when it is the employee who settles the suit.
Taylor v. Industnal Comm'n, 743 P.2d 1183
(Utah 1987)

npensation.
mpensation", within the meaning of this
n, is limited to amounts claimed by the
yee or the dependents Allstate Ins Co.
ss, 725 P 2d 1330 (Utah 1986)
fixed
payment
made
under
-68(2)(a), when it is determined that a
ted employee had no dependents, is not
ensation" within the meaning of this secnd where the decedent's parents sued the
asor and its insurer, the insurance fund
neither invade the parents' recovery nor
i a separate claim against the insurer in
to recover the amount paid into the Secjury Fund. Allstate Ins. Co. v Bliss, 725
330 (Utah 1986)

State insurance fund.
State insurance fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) had no nght to recover for compensation benefits paid out of that part of a wrongful death recovery due to heirs who had received no workmen's compensation benefits.
Ohveras v Canbou-Four Corners, Inc., 598
P 2d 1320 (Utah 1979).

employment
,her subcontractor placing timbers in
of large building nor materialmen supscaffolding for use in construction was
ad "in the same employment" as emof general construction contractor for
lg within meaning of this section Peter-

Subrogation.
Where employee's onginal injury was aggravated by physician's malpractice, insurance
earner was subrogated to employee's action
against the physician, but if a greater amount
was recovered than that paid employee in compensation, the employee was entitled to it.
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Employee of a masonry subcontractor whose
work was subject to the control of the general
contractor was an employee of general contractor for purposes of this section and was not entitled to recover m tort against the general
contractor. Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah
2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972).

Baker v. Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d 77
(1938).
Third-party liability.
Fact that defendant owned ore stockpile did
not make defendant a possessor of the land and
thereby liable as third party under this section
for death of contractor's employee caused by
unsafe condition of stockpile. Stevens v. Colorado Fuel & Iron, 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3
(1970).

Cited in Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814
F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Right to maintain malpractice suit against
injured employee's attending physician notwithstanding receipt of workmen's compensation award, 28 A.L.R.3d 1066.
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
«=» 2158.

C.J.S. — 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 983 et seq.
A.L.R. — Uninsured motorist coverage: validity and effect of policy provision purporting
to reduce coverage by amount paid under
workmen's compensation law, 24 A.L.R.3d
1369.

35-1-63. Judgments in favor of commission — Preference.
All judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by the commission or by
the state under the authority of this title shall have the same preference
against the assets of the employer as claims for taxes.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 74; C.L. 1917,
§ 3135; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-59.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Extent of preference.
Judgment meeting requirements of this section is only given a preference equal to the
preference of tax claims in distribution of assets and is not given same status as a tax lien;
accordingly, judgment of Industrial Commis-

sion for insurance premium is not entitled to
be paid out of proceeds of sale of mortgaged
real estate ahead of prior mortgagee. Local Realty Co. v. Steele, 90 Utah 468, 62 P.2d 558
(1936).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation & 638.

Key Numbers. —- Workers' Compensation
•» 1765.

35-1-64. Compensation — None for first three days after
injury unless disability extended.
No compensation shall be allowed for the first three days after the injury is
received, except the disbursements hereinafter authorized for medical, nurse
and hospital services, and for medicines and funeral expenses, provided, however, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more than fourteen days,
compensation shall also be payable for the first three days after the injury is
received.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. — "Dual capacity doctrine" as basis
for employee's recovery for medical malpractice from company medical personnel, 73
A.L.R.4th 115.
Workers' compensation: third-party tort lia-

bility of corporate officer to injured workers, 76
A.L.R.4th 365.
Workers1 compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor's tort action, 77
A.L.R.4th 844.

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statutory employers.
The legislature has, in clear and unmistakable language, evinced an intention to allow
suits by an injured worker against those persons who might be his or her statutory employers as defined in § 35-1-42. The immediate, or common-law, employer, who actually
pays compensation, and its officers, agents,
and employees are shielded by the exclusive
remedy immunity conferred by § 35-1-60. Pate
v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah
1989)
The decision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co,
777 P 2d 428 (Utah 1989), holding that the
state Workers' Compensation Act should no

longer be construed to provide tort immunity
to statutory employers who have not been required to pay benefits thereunder to the injured worker, should be given retroactive effect. Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349
(10th Cir. 1989) (reversing Lamb v. W-Energy,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1987), which
appears under "Applicability of section" catchline in bound volume)
A worker can sue a statutory employer who
has not been required to pay workers' compensation benefits, and the latter is not protected
by the immunity afforded by § 35-1-60 Bosch
v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P2d 431
(Utah 1989)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Prejudicial effect of bringing to
jury's attention fact that plaintiff in personal
injury or death action is entitled to workers'
compensation benefits, 69 A.L.R.4th 131.
Workers' compensation: third-party tort liability of corporate officer to injured workers, 76
A.L.R.4th 365.

44

Workers' compensation compensability of
injuries incurred traveling to orfirommedical
treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83
A.L.R.4th 110.

ADDENDUM 2
Utah Liability Reform Act
§ 78-27-37 to § 78-27-43

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-37

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Release «= 25 et seq.

78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement by injured person — Notice of rescission or disavowal.
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is
given when it is deposited in a mailbox, properly addressed with postage
prepaid. Notice of cancellation given by the injured person need not take a
particular form and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. JUT. 2d § 14 et seq.
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. § 38 et seq.

78-27-36- Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise
existing in the law.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-36.

78-27-37, Definitions.
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to
diminishment of damages and assumption of
risk, and reenacts the above section,
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78-27-38. Comparative negligenceThe fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above section.

Cross-References. — Product Liability Act,
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substantial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5.
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assumption of risk.
Bailment.
Causation.
Jury instructions.
Last clear chance. .
Unit method of determining negligence.
Cited.
Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a
lack of due care constituting negligence; where
such is the case and the party assuming the
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by
comparative negligence statute, he is chargeable with contributory negligence and is liable
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accordance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1977).
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously
dealt with under that terminology but is to be
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory
negligence; when the issue is raised attention
should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge
of it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the person seeking to recover acted in light of ail the
surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person from whom recovery is sought, any damages allowed should be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.

Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980).
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981).
Bailment
The comparative negligence statutes do not
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee
in handling the bailed property is not imputed
to the bailor. Otto v. Leany, 635 P.2d 410
(Utah 1981).
Causation.
Trial court committed prejudicial error in
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs comparative negligence where his act of alleged
negligence did not in any way contribute to his
injury, although it may have increased severity of damages; comparative negligence becomes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in
causing injury. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984).
Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
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Unit method of determining negligence.
In a medical malpractice case, the "Wisconsin" method of determining comparative negligence, whereby each defendant's negligence is
compared against the plaintiffs, was rejected
in favor of the "unit" method whereby the negligence of all the defendants is taken together
in making the comparison. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903
(Utah 1984).
Cited in Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530
(Utah 1979).

or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658
591 (Utah 1982).
t clear chance.
ith the adoption of the Comparative Negli:e Act, the doctrine of last clear chance as a
net tort doctrine was extinguished along
> contributory negligence; however, argut to the jury as to whether a party may or
not have had the last clear chance to avoid
ry is not precluded, and as bearing on
:h party was guilty of the greater negli:e, last clear chance becomes just one of
y factors to be weighed in the comparison.
>n v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
tan Law Review. — Note, A Primer on
lages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and
rival Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519.
)mment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light
— Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Negnce Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 569.
>me Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons
roducts Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev.

A.L.R. — Comparative negligence rule
where misconduct of three or more persons is
involved, 8 A.L.R.3d 722.
Retrospective application of state statute
substituting rule of comparative negligence for
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d
1438.
Indemnity or contribution between joint tortfeasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d
184.
Modern development of comparative negligence doctrine having applicability to negligence actions generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339.
Application of comparative negligence doctrine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206.
Comparative negligence doctrine applied to
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9
A.L.R.4th 633.
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence
rules on assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700.
Key Numbers. — Negligence *=» 97 et seq.

New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the
ntieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L.
. 495, 496.
ulherin v. Ingersoli: Utah Adopts Compare Principles in Strict Products Liability
BS, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461.
righam Young Law Review. — The
ger of Comparative Fault Principles with
ct Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersolld Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964, 966.
m. Jur. 2d. — 57 Am. Jur. 2d § 426 et seq.
.J.S. — 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 169 et

-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
.Tie trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
,ny, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damss sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
son seeking recovery and to each defendant.
istory: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L.
6, ch. 199, § 3.
epeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reenacts the above section.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it

finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to confuse or mislead the jury Dixon v Stewart, 658
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

78-27-40, Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to

settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts
the above section.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of contribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 69(h)
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Indemnity contract.
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Workmen's compensation.
Indemnity contract.
The former comparative negligence provisions did not invalidate an employer's indemnity contract with a third party whereby employer agreed to indemnify the third party
against claims arising out of injuries to the employer's employees. Shell Oil Co. v. Bnnkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1983).
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment in
action against a defendant to recover the property loss sustained as the result of a collision
between automobiles operated by defendant

and the minor unemancipated daughter of the
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence
contributed to the property loss sustained by
her father, the minor daughter was a joint tortfeasor and liable to the defendant for contribution. Bishop v Nielsen, 632 P 2d 864 (Utah
1981).
Workmen's compensation.
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to
an injury to his employee covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon
Elec, Inc., 552 P 2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P 2d 153 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Allows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De-

spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v,
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y U L. Rev 429.
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i-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
\ person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation,
ly join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
ury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
termmed their respective proportions of fault.
listory: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L.
K5, ch. 199, § 5.
lepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 5, relating to
rights of contribution and indemnity, and reenacts the above section.

1-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
k release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
t discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to
release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of
claim, and reenacts the above section.

listory: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L.
16, ch. 199, § 6.
tepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Lm. JUT. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur 2d § 35 et seq
J.J.S. — 76 C.J S § 38 et seq.
L.L.R. — Tortfeasor's general release of cotfeasor as affecting former's right of contnlon against cotortfeasor, 34 A.L.R.3d 1374
Release of one responsible for injury as af,ing liability of physician or surgeon for
[hgent treatment of injury, 39 A.L R 3d 260
Voluntary payment into court of judgment

against one joint tortfeasor as release of others,
40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Release of one negligently treating injury as
affecting liability of one originally responsible
for injury, 64 A.L.R.3d 839.
Validity and effect of agreement with one
cotortfeasor setting aside his maximum liability and providing for reduction or extinguishment thereof relative to recovery against nonagreeing cotortfeasor, 65 A.L.R.3d 602.

i-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common
v or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, govimental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive
nedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through
-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising
m statute, contract, or agreement.
listory: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L.
16, ch. 199, § 7.
Lepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43. as en2d by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to
sase of joint tortfeasors and contribution,
I reenacts the above section.
everability Clauses. — Laws 1986, ch.

199, § 9 provided: "If any provision of
§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the application of any provisions of those sections to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remaining provisions of those sections shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or
application "
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contract negotiations were conducted by telephone calls to Salt Lake City, where the contract was ultimately drafted and signed.
Romney v St. John Virgin Grand Villas
Assocs., 734 F Supp 957 (D. Utah 1990).
Paternity s u i t
A nonresident submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts in a paternity suit
for the purpose of establishing responsibility
for child support when he has engaged in sexual intercourse within the state. By negative
implication, it follows that when the intercourse occurs outside the state, the legislature
did not intend to subject the nonresident to
Utah jurisdiction in the absence of other contacts by him with the state. Baldwin v.
Easterlmg, 754 P 2d 942 (Utah 1988).
Plaintiff, who was impregnated in Pennsylvania before returning to her mother's home in
Utah, could not '"bootstrap" her paternity
claim upon a separate misrepresentation
claim, where her paternity claim did not "arise
from" any misrepresentation regarding defendant's promise to pay h w ratvarn a n fare to
Pennsylvania and to support her and the child.
Baldwin v Easterlmg, 754 P2d 942 (Utah
1988).
Proof of jurisdiction.
When a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendants have sufficient contacts with Utah and this litigation for assertion of personal jurisdiction consistent with

due process, then requiring the defendants to
subject themselves to trial in a Utah court for
the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff could prove jurisdiction was proper. Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 148
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990)
Transaction of any business.
—Business losses.
The place where business was lost reflects
the economic reality of impact injury in the
case of commercial torts. Loss of profits within
a state in which a place of business is maintained simply is an insufficient basis on which
to find that the injury occurred within that
state as compared with the impact of actual
business lost in another state. STV Int'l Mktg.
v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F Supp. 1070 (D
Utah 1990).
Federal district court lacked jurisdiction in
an action against a Delaware corporation for
breach of contract and tortious interference
with economic relationships, where the alleged
business losses occurred in Europe, and contacts with \3tah were not on\y re\ative\y minuscule in quantity but were tangential to the
parties' relationship STV Intl Mktg. v
Cannondale Corp , 750 F Supp. 1070 (D Utah
1990).
Cited in Lister v Marangom Meccanica, 728
F. Supp. 1524 (D Utah 1990), Anderson v
American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 148 Utah
Adv Rep. 3 (1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev 166.
Note, Parry v Ernst Home Center Corporation. The "Mauling" of Personal Jurisdiction
Theory, 1990 Utah L. Rev 479
A.L.R. — Products liability- personal juris-

diction over nonresident manufacturer of component incorporated in another product, 69
A.L.R.4th 14.
In personam jurisdiction, in libel and slander
action, over nonresident who mailed allegedly
defamatory letter from outside state, 83
A.L.R.4th 1006.

78-27-37. Definitions.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Deats v Commercial Sec. Bank,
746 P2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For
comment, 'The Liability Reform Act* An Approach to Equitable Application," see 13 J.
Contemp L 89 (1987)

A.L.R. — Liability to one struck by golf ball,
53 A L.R.4th 282.
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78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
instructions given on negligence, was a correct
statement of a plaintiffs duty in negligence action. Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746 P.2d
1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).

ANALYSIS

Assumption of risk.
Jury instructions.
Open and obvious danger.
Wrongful death.
Cited.
Assumption of risk.
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate in an instruction under comparative negligence statutes. Stephens v. Henderson, 741
P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) (applying statute in effect pnor to 1986).
The assumption of risk doctrine has been expressly abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to
recovery due to its incompatibility with the
comparative negligence system. Donahue v.
Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Jury instructions.
Instruction that "ordinarily, a plaintiff in
any action has the duty of seeing and avoiding,
if reasonable, a hazard which is plainly visible,
and if the plaintiff [unreasonably] failed to do
so, then the plaintiff is negligent either in failing to look or in failing to heed what he or she
saw/* when read together with all of the other

Open and obvious danger.
By establishing a comparative negligence
system, the legislature has by necessary implication abolished the open and obvious danger
rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's
recovery. Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Wrongful death.
The 1973 legislation that abolished the common-law contributory negligence defense and
made comparative negligence the governing
tort principle did not overrule pre-1973 case
law construing the term "wrongful" in the
wrongful death statute nor did it free a wrongful death plaintiff from the imputation of any
negligent conduct of the decedent. Kelson v
Salt Lake County, 784 P 2d 1152 (Utah 1989).
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F.
Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1987); Western Fiberglass,
Inc. v Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P 2d
34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For
comment, T h e Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable Application," 13 J
Contemp. L. 89 (1987).
AX.R. — Commercial renter's negligence liability for customer's personal injuries, 57
A.L.R.4th 1186.
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63
A.L.R.4th 221.
Liability for injury incurred in operation of
power golf cart, 66 A.L.R.4th 622.

Tort liability for window washer's injury or
death, 69 A.L.R.4th 207.
Comparative fault: calculation of net recovery by applying percentage of plaintiffs fault
before or after subtracting amount of settlement by less than all joint tortfeasors, 71
A.L.R.4th 1108.
Rescue doctrine: applicability and application of comparative negligence principles, 75
A.L.R.4th 875.

78-27-40, Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
Cited.
Applicability of section.
A statute, such as this section, eliminating

injuries occurring pnor to its effective date.
Where the injuries occurred on November 8,
1984, and the Liability Reform Act was not
effective until April 28, 1986, the trial court
was correct in holding that the Liability Reform Act did not apply. SteDhens v Ut>nA*~>~~

78-27-41
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Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F.
Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For from medical attendant aggravating injury or
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Ap- causing new injury in course of treatment, 72
proach to Equitable Application," see 13 J. A.LJL4th 231.
Contemp. L. 89 (1987).
Products liability: seller's right to indemnity
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially caus- from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278.
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution

78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Products liability: seller's nght to
indemnity from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th
278.

78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially caus- causing new injury in course of treatment, 72
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution A.L.R4th 231.
from medical attendant aggravating injury or
Products liability: seller's nght to indemnity
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278.

78-27-44. Personal injury judgments — Interest authorized.
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by any person, resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person,
corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or willful intent of that other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and
whether that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, the plaintiff in
the complaint may claim interest on the special damages actually incurred
from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action.
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that
action, to add to the amount of special damages actually incurred that are
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that
amount calculated at the legal rate, as defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date
of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the date of
entering the judgment, and to include it in that judgment.
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not
include damages for future medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss of
future earning capacity.
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78-27-43, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973

8

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

9
10

Section 1.

enacted

by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

11

78-27-37,

12

(1)

13

Section 78-27-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:

"Defendant"

means

any person not immune from suit who is claimed

to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.

14

(2)

"Fault" means

any

actionable

breach

of

legal

duty,

act,

or

15

omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained

16

by

17

all its

18

liability,

19

liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product,

20

a person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in

(3)

degrees,
breach

contributory
of

express

negligence,

21

reimbursement

22

authorized to act as legal representative,

23
24

Section 2.

its

own

of

risk,

strict

or implied warranty of a product, products

"Person seeking recovery" means
on

assumption

any

person

seeking

damages

or

behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is

Section 78-27-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

enacted

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

-2-

by
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1

78-27-38.

01-31-86 4:54 PM

The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar

2

recovery by that person.

3

defendants whose fault exceeds his own.

4

any

5

fault attributable to that defendant.

6
7

defendant

or

group

of

However, no defendant is liable to

seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of

Section 3.

Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

enacted

by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

8
9

person

He may recover from any

78-27-39.
direct

The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall,

the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the

10

total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault

11

attributable to each person seeking recovery, to

12

each other person whose fault contributed to the injury or damages.

13
14

Section 4.

Section

each

defendant,

to

8-27-40, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

15

78-27-40.

Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a

16

defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is

17

or

18

fault

19

contribution from any other person.

20
21

and

that

percentage

proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
attributed

Section 5.

to

that

Section

defendant.

No

defendant

is

entitled

to

78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

22

78-27-41.
the

A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a

party

23

to

litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused

24

or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery

^^

the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.

is

sought,

for

Ul-Jl-Sb tiM

SUBSTITUTE S. B. No. 64
1
2

Section 6.

Section

78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

3

78-27-42.

A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more

4

defendants does not discharge

5

provides.

6
7

Section 7.

Section

any other defendant

unless

the

release

78-27-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by

78-27-43.

Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through

78-27-42

affects

not

H

and the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1,

12

Sections

13

indemnity or contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement.

15
16

limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63,

78-27-37

Section 8.

through

78-27-42

affects

Title

or

35.

impairs

Nothing

in

right

to

any

Section 78-27-53, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

enacted

by

Chapter 166, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to read:
78-27-53.

Notwithstanding

anything

17

through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no

18

against,

19

any of the inherent risks of skiing.

20

or

impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but

10

14

so

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

8
9

m

or

in

skier

[section] Sections 78-27-37

[shaii]

may

make

any

claim

recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from

Section 9.

If any provision of Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43,

21

tr.e application

of

any

provision

22

circumstance, is held invalid, the remaining provisions of

23

shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
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of

those

sections

or

to any person or
those

sections

SUBSTITUTE S. B. No. 64

1

Section 10.

This
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act

takes

effect upon approval by the governor, or

2

the day following the constitutional time limit

3

without

4

veto override.

the

governor's

signature,
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of

Article

VII,

Sec. 8

or in the case of a veto, the date of

ADDENDUM 4
Senator Kay S. Cornaby's letter
dated February 4, 1986

S E N A T E
STATE

C H A M B E R
OF
UTAH

SALT LAKE

CITY

February 4, 1986
Mr, President:
The State and Local Standing Committee, to which was
referred S.B. No. 64, LIABILITY REFORM ACT, by Senator Haven J.
Barlow et al, has carefully considered the bill and reports it
out of committee with the recommendation that the original bill
ce deleted in body and title and that Substitute S.B. No. 64
replace the original bill.
Substitute S.B. No. 64 to be amended as follows:
1.

Page 3, line 11:
After "recovery" delete 'V* and insert "and"

2.

Page 3, line 11:
After "defendant" delete the rest of the line.

3.

Page 3, line 12:
Line 12, delete the rest of the line except the pe
Respectfully

